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By calling themselves to remember Africa and/or the racial past, Black Americans are actually re-
membering, as in repopulating broad continuities within the African diaspora. This movement is non-
linear, and it disrupts our notions of chronology… an investigation of Harlem as a northern urban 
community reveals direct—deliberate, crafted ties—to the American south and then to Africa. and these 
are not places but stages or sites on which the drama of self-acquisition is played.  
— Melvin Dixon, “The Black Writer’s Use of Memory”1 
 
 
In “The Black Writer’s Use of Memory,” Melvin Dixon outlines rather nicely some of 
the ways African-American writers have employed sites of memory in their work. Such 
writers call on us to reconsider the psychic and physical spaces we inhabit and how we 
use those spaces to complete various senses of group or individual identity. Sites of 
memory validate identities by anchoring a group’s or individual’s historically paratactic 
experience within a structure of meaning, retroactively inscribing such subjects into 
referential, narratable places in space and time. Such feats are by nature acquisitive, 
constantly calling real and imagined pasts into the service of the present and enabling 
African Americans to, as Dixon puts it, “enlarge the frame of cultural reference for the 
depiction of black experiences by anchoring that experience in memory—a memory that 
ultimately rewrites history.”2 
The term “site of memory” was popularized in the late eighties by the French 
historian Pierre Nora, who claims that lieux de mémoire have become necessary in the 
absence of milieux de mémoire, “real environments of memory.”3 In Nora’s schema, a real 
environment of memory is characterized by a people’s daily commitment to tradition, 
ritual, and the transmission of the past to each generation, which is to say that within a 
“real environment of memory” habitus is structured by the connection between 
contemporary practices of living and the pasts of those practices. The cultural efficacy of 
such an environment disappears, however, when a community becomes subject to the 
ruptures we have come to associate with modernity and can no longer locate its reason 
for being in the perpetuation of shared and culturally [429] supported pasts. It is in this 
sense that sites of memory are produced in response to specific needs and demands, 
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coming into being through absence and literally placed in lieu of lost connections. 
Building on Dixon’s aforementioned sense of African-American memory work as 
playing out on a series of sites or stages, I am interested in narratives of excavation, 
particularly how such narratives attempt simultaneous creations and reclamations of 
selves feared lost in transition. In this essay, I will examine how one poet, Langston 
Hughes, constructs a site of memory that trumps the ravages of time and space and at 
how his contemporary, Countee Cullen, critiques Hughes’s strategy by foregrounding 
the limits inherent to such artifice. Each author, I believe, is caught up in the tide of 
social and cultural nation-building important to the Harlem Renaissance, and where 
each stands in relation to the question of the past’s representation ultimately bears on 
each author’s take on what it means to be an artist.  
Even though Nora himself was mainly concerned with transformations in French 
society, particularly the diminishing status of the local in the face of mass culture, 
thinking about sites of memory offers us a way of thinking about how people might 
work through other kinds of unwanted or unexpected losses of community, a pervasive 
concern for anyone building identity in a diasporic context.4 It is important to 
understand, for instance, that the “re-membering” Dixon refers to grew more pervasive 
in a time of growing disillusionment, as many African Americans who arrived in 
Harlem found it difficult to reconcile the material reality of the place with the desires 
and imagination that had brought them there. By the end of World War I, Harlem had 
become a diasporic homeland for post-emancipation African Americans from all over 
the United States and the Caribbean; yet, even by the beginning of what would come to 
be known as the Harlem Renaissance, Harlem had already come to exceed itself as 
merely one of many New York neighborhoods, insofar as the Harlem Renaissance—a 
revolution in how black Americans thought about and talked about themselves—was in 
fact launching in a variety of northern cities, all of which were flooded with southern 
blacks looking for new lives. In this way the Harlem Renaissance was about much more 
than place per se, for in general black people’s northward migration simultaneously 
signified other kinds of movements, movements, or perhaps more specifically 
moments, undergirded by transformations in ideas about how to be, by new senses of 
being that transcended mere spatiality. The Great Migration thus also signified moves 
from slavery to freedom, from illiteracy to the literary and informational, and from 
tradesmanship [430] and land tillage to industrialized work and professionalization. 
Overdetermined, the term “Harlem” had come, then, to signify everything the post-
emancipation United States was supposed to offer. It is in this way that the Harlem 
Renaissance was as much as anything about remaking oneself in time, over and against 
being in a specific place, an interchange often made possible through feats of memory.  
Throughout African-American literature and culture we find repeated references to 
the “many thousands gone,” a lamentation shaped in slavery and echoed even in the 
requisite libations performed in much contemporary African-American popular culture. 
Perhaps at first the gone were the families and communities left behind in Africa; 
maybe later they were the ones who never survived the Middle Passage or the ones 
who died in slavery. Maybe they were families, friends, lovers, and children separated 
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on the auction block or relationships fragmented by the scatter-effect of the Great 
Migration. Maybe they were the ancestors sacrificed to the exigencies of racial passing 
or, later, the black neighborhoods stunted by the deepening pervasiveness of urban 
blight. Indeed, on the facts alone, it might be reasonable to theorize the African-
American community as one manifestly constituted through loss, losses that are often 
represented as migrations, as passages away. But, somehow, even as such a litany of 
unbearable losses carries more than a little something, it cannot carry everything. For 
even though “lamentation and mortification,” as Karla Holloway puts it, have “both 
found their way into public and private representations of African America to an 
astonishing degree,” with that tradition of loss also comes a tradition of “grace, hope, 
and resilience.”5 The losses may be unbearable, but, even sometimes paradoxically, they 
have been borne, and this despite the immense variety of physical and psychic 
violences put to making African arrivals in the New World as symbolically terrible as 
they were materially terminal. What we might come to realize, then, is that the term 
“migration” names a dialectic characterized at its poles by longing and innovation, by 
mourning and transformation. Becoming gone, in other words, is a process that 
transforms the lives of the people passing away and the lives of those who must come 
after. Every gone does not necessarily mean goodbye.  
It is difficult to theorize migration’s recoveries because it is difficult to imagine most 
kinds of afterlives, more so when we know that so many of the migrations forced and 
undertaken in the black diasporic experience have historically ended in death, terror, 
and destruction. But understanding recovery, understanding the fact that lives might 
again become livable after terrible events, is necessary to the interpretation [431] of any 
art growing out of such events. The fact of writing after Middle Passage is particularly 
compelling when considered in light of the ways in which that journey might also be 
read as a journey out of subjectivity itself: from person to slave, from African subject to 
American commodity. In 1789, Olaudah Equiano would recount his own such journey 
from subject to object. Facing outward, towards the sea and away from home:  
 
The first object that saluted my eyes when I arrived on the coast was the sea, and a slave ship, 
which was then riding at anchor, and waiting for its cargo. These filled me with astonishment, 
that was soon converted into terror, which I am yet at a loss to describe, and much more the then 
feelings of my mind when I was carried on board. I was immediately handled and tossed up to 
see if I was sound.6 
 
Standing at the threshold, Equiano sees the sea, which he describes as a “first object,” 
adding “and a slave ship” as if the vessel were a mere accessory to the crucial first 
object, the site of the crime. Astonished by the alien ship, “waiting for its cargo,” the 
newly enslaved African would not, even in retrospect, be able to find the language with 
which to express the quality of this terror. The “toss[ing]” in fact presupposes the 
absence of speaking, insofar as it presupposes the absence of personhood. Another 
captured African, Quobna Ottoba Cugoano, would write of his experience:  
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[W]hen a vessel arrived to conduct us away to the ship, it was a most horrible scene; there was 
nothing to be heard but the rattling of chains, smacking of whips, and the groans and cries of our 
fellow-men.7 
Metonymic, Cugoano’s narrative sinks into passive voice as the scene’s full implication 
comes to his reader in chains of sound and signification. Both men’s descriptions move 
away from first-person, intensifying their descriptions of an intense breaking away at 
the genesis of a new identification:  
 
When I looked round the ship too [I] saw a multitude of Black people, of every description, 
chained together, every one of their countenances expressing dejection and sorrow, I no longer 
doubted of my fate.8 
 
Equiano’s recognition of himself as the ship’s cargo comes simultaneously with his 
recognition of other black people, people whom he, before this moment, would have 
had no reason to identify as black. Previously, if they were to at all be identifiable to 
him, it would have been through a series of other signifiers, through ethnicity, 
religion, [432] language, and so on. Nor would he have had reason even to identify with 
them. Racial difference, as it were, was not a difference that mattered before Equiano’s 
recognition of his own position within a new structure of meaning; his recognition of 
himself as a slave comes suddenly and through a nascent cognition of such difference. 
Like the sly permeation of saltwater through a coetaneous boundary, it is an awareness 
that assails the sensational body, drawing the boundaries of its imprisonment with 
sight, sound, smell, and touch. Forced to identify with the “black people, of every 
description, chained together,” Equiano is put at a loss in his own transfiguration from 
an active, desiring subject into the object of an abject sentence. When Equiano steps onto 
the vessel and becomes the cargo, he enters into his new identity as a slave. He writes, 
“[Q]uite overpowered with horror and anguish, I fell motionless on the deck, and 
fainted.”9 
In neither Equiano’s nor Cugoano’s account is there a sense that any future could 
possibly follow those first moments of each man’s enslavement. Their migrations are 
experienced as journeys into hell, and their stories narrativize processes of becoming 
one of the many thousands gone. Yet despite their descent into goneness, we also know 
that both men lived. Neither man would physically return to Africa, however, and the 
general absence of stories of return perhaps contributes to a historical sense of that first 
passage across the Atlantic Ocean as a movement across a critical and absolute 
boundary. Situated in both men’s autobiographies as a state of freedom to which each 
slave must rightfully be returned, Africa becomes a figuration, a story of a stolen past 
told in the service of their political work as abolitionists. More than a century later, a 
young Hughes would travel the world by ship, eventually crossing the Atlantic and 
returning to Africa, where he hoped to recover this past. The return, however, was not 
so easy, as the kind of ontological and spiritual recovery he sought would require more 
than landing on the soil of a land that had in fact been passed down to him as a figure. 
Ultimately, his journey to Africa may have been less satisfying than an earlier literary 
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attempt, a metaphorical passage made possible through his exploration of a site of 
memory.  
I. Flowing 
In the first volume of his autobiography, The Big Sea, Hughes recalls writing one of his 
best known poems, 1921’s “The Negro Speaks of Rivers.” The poem was written during 
a time of relative despair, when, despite having both parents, he thought of himself as 
an orphan.10  [433] This sense of alienation is especially evident in his relationship to his 
father, a man with whom Hughes could not imagine identifying. In his autobiography, 
Hughes repeatedly remarks on this distance, often linking it to his father’s “strange 
dislike of his own people,” a dislike contrary to the younger Hughes, who claimed to 
trace many of his own best memories to working alongside other black people, mostly 
migrants from the South: “They seemed to me,” he writes, “like the gayest and the 
bravest people possible—these Negroes from the Southern ghettoes—facing 
tremendous odds, working and laughing and trying to get somewhere in the world.”11 
When reading The Big Sea, and his later volume, I Wonder As I Wander, one cannot 
help but notice how Hughes spent much of his young-adult life in transit, which seems 
compelling in the life of a man whose artistic life work was so deeply invested in 
locking down the loci of African-American experience. Sitting on a train, on a journey to 
Mexico to meet his estranged father, Hughes has his first encounter with a site of 
memory, which he retells in the following way:  
 
now it was just sunset, and we crossed the Mississippi, slowly, over a long bridge. I looked out 
the window of the Pullman at the great muddy river flowing down toward the heart of the south, 
and I began to think what that river, the old Mississippi, had meant to negroes in the past—how 
to be sold down the river was the worse fate that could overtake a slave in times of bondage. 
Then I remembered reading how Abraham Lincoln had made a trip down the Mississippi on a 
raft to New Orleans, and how he had seen slavery at its worst, and had decided within himself 
that it should be removed from American life. Then I began to think about other rivers in our 
past—the Congo, and the Niger, and the Nile in Africa—and the thought came to me: “I’ve 
known rivers,” . . . as the train gathered speed in the dusk, I had written this poem, which I called 
“The negro speaks of rivers.”12  
Historically, being “sold down the river” did not always have to mean that one would 
actually take a trip down the Mississippi, yet even today the phrase nonetheless evokes 
a sense of irrevocable passage. During slavery it meant a trip to the auction block; today 
it still connotes deep betrayal. As a site of memory, the Mississippi may as well evoke 
the Atlantic, perhaps even a cultural memory of water as metonym for loss and 
separation.13 But, in this passage, as soon as Hughes evokes the site’s meaning, he 
immediately begins to recuperate it by pulling into his narrative the highly contested 
(though one would not think so here) story of Lincoln’s journey down the Mississippi. 
By doing so, Hughes neutralizes the despair culturally attached to travel down 
the [434] Mississippi, thus making it so that his narrative can instead end with slavery 
being “removed from American life.” So openly recuperative; there is a sense here that 
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the Lincoln story cannot quite align the end of the reminiscence with its beginning. But, 
nonetheless reaffirmed, Hughes is now able to recall “other rivers in our past,” African 
rivers, followed by the realization: “‘I’ve known rivers.’“  
Hughes stages his final realization as an epiphany, as a revelation that has come to 
him via a journey back into his own memory, a journey I think we are supposed to 
understand as back into the self. This journey, he tells us, inspired “The Negro Speaks 
of Rivers,” in which he draws an important relationship between blood and water, vis-
à-vis the figure of the river:  
 
I’ve known rivers: 
I’ve known rivers ancient as the world and older than the  
flow of human blood in human veins.14  
 
IAntecedent to human experience is the fact of the river, the flow of which is here 
represented as ahistorical and outside the passage of human time. In this stanza there is 
an implicit similarity between water and the “flow of human blood in human veins,” 
and it is through the construction of this identity-potentiate that Hughes is able to 
articulate a mobile and fluid subject, an enunciative “I” who has become as ahistorical 
as water itself. Indeed, if we understand Hughes as the “I” of the first stanza, as well as 
the Negro of the title, we can think of this poem as the Negro knows, and is therefore 
authorized to speak of, can tell others about, rivers:  
 
I bathed in the Euphrates when dawns were young. 
I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to sleep.  
I looked upon the Nile and raised pyramids above it.  
I heard the singing of the Mississippi when Abe Lincoln  
went down to New Orleans, and I’ve seen its muddy  
bosom turn all golden in the sunset.  
(5–10)  
By positioning himself as the Negro of rivers, Hughes asserts his own timelessness as an 
experiential fact, particularly as this timelessness is made analogous to the lack of 
distance between the poem’s geographical sites: read the river as blood, blood that 
flows across the landscape of time and space and through all Negroes. Within such a 
reading, the river signifies multiple I’s that can be expressed as one. Such a reading also 
reveals the poem’s heliocentric structure, as meaning radiates [435] outward from the 
central set of images of the various rivers. This set at once describes and enables the 
multiple subject, a historically active I that attests to witnessing itself in its own past—I 
bathed, I built, I looked, I heard, I saw, I know—and thereby makes it appropriate for the 
poem to end with the moment of its own genesis. By returning the outer rings of its 
meaning to its center, the poem’s structure becomes circular in three dimensions. 
Hughes watches the sun set over the Mississippi.  
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In the poem’s denouement, “[m]y soul” (13) stands as a universal soul that deepens 
with experience and also allows more than one way to read the poem’s title. On the one 
hand, to speak is to say, to tell of or to something actively: the Negro is the speaking 
subject. To speak, however, can also be interpreted as an adjectival gesture: the Negro 
“speaks of,” as in reminds one of, bespeaks, rivers. In this second sense, “Negro” 
becomes a metaphor for “rivers,” which authorizes the assertion “My soul has grown 
deep like the rivers” (13), and thus allows the speaker to graft onto a black collectivity a 
historical soul herein made continuous with his own, no-longer-problematic identity. In 
the discursive space of the poem, this soul recalls each episode as it witnesses itself 
across boundaries of time, space, and the Middle Passage. In his creation of a site of 
memory Hughes displaces responsibility for transcendence of the thetic onto water and 
thus transforms a site of historical loss into one of recovery, while nevertheless still 
carrying a trace of its original negative signification. Ultimately, the historical accuracy 
of each image in the poem’s central stanza may be irrelevant as the text establishes itself 
as a lieu de mémoire, referenced to the racialized body: “And these are not places but 
stages or sites on which the drama of self-acquisition is played.”  
In Revolution in Poetic Language, Julia Kristeva insists that “the thetic conditions the 
possibilities of truth specific to language: all transgressions of the thetic are a crossing of 
the boundary between true and false.”15 If we understand the thetic as a term for a loss 
that cannot be recovered, in the sense that it is impossible for us to return to the world 
we occupied prior to desire, prior to language and the break that makes language 
possible, then to speak or write truthfully is to accept that limit: one only speaks of what 
one knows or sees, a constant and undying gesturing toward verisimilitude; anything 
else is only the product of an unselfaware imagination. The exception to this, however, 
lies in what Kristeva dubs “poetic language,” a generative language that comes into 
being as a trace of an absence recognized or remembered vis-à-vis the semiotic.16 She 
goes on to add that [436]  
 
[m]imesis, in our view, is a transgression of the thetic when truth is no longer a reference to an 
object that is identifiable outside of language; it refers instead to an object that can be constructed 
through the semiotic network but is nevertheless posited in the symbolic and is, from then on, 
always verisimilar.17 
 
Even though Hughes’s place-names of course refer to material places, as sites of 
memory, Hughes’s rivers are posited firmly in the symbolic and do not in fact exist 
outside of language. They are real and true places insofar as they exist to the subject, 
but false as they are not verifiable outside of an interpretative act, an act made possible 
only by the absence of the places themselves; again, in lieu thereof. With this poem, 
Hughes attempts to replace a racial past characterized by loss by diverting attention 
from the fact of that loss, even though it is the loss itself that engendered the text—and 
it is in this sense that the poem’s citation of its constitutive absence reveals a 
fundamentally elegiac strategy, despite the recuperative elation with which the poem 
ends. Transformative in its symbolic turn, for it is in fact not a return, “The Negro 
Speaks of Rivers” is fully self-referential and self-authorizing in its attempt to tell us the 
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truth about African-American origins and the veracity of black identity. It subverts 
notions of linear temporality, instead relying on repetition to convey a sense of 
constant, active flow, as if after the ending, “My soul has grown deep like the rivers,” 
the poem could regenerate itself. In this way, Hughes imbues water with agency and 
represents it as the embodiment of perfect memory. Maybe, with time, the specific 
images would change—but the text, or rather its sub-textual energy, will always 
remain, beautiful and nostalgic, able to recast a moment in its most generative, 
therapeutic light.  
On the one hand, to establish a site of memory commensurate with one’s own body 
seems an efficacious strategy for overcoming the losses inherent to forced migration. 
Yet in its effort to overcome historical rupture and fragmentation, “The Negro Speaks of 
Rivers” produces a potentially haunting ideality, for the image the poem reflects back to 
its reader may exceed the reader’s capacity to in fact meet the image and thereby 
experience the promise it offers. Further, insofar as successful identification relies on 
social ratification, Hughes’s consciously racialized, homogenous site proves materially 
inadequate. The African-American subject is by necessity a hybrid subject; for although 
there was not for Hughes a ratified identification with an ideal Americaness, for which 
we may hold responsible the racism of twentieth-century America, the fact of the 
Middle Passage nonetheless disallows an African American’s identification as purely 
African. [437]  
Years after writing “The Negro Speaks of Rivers,” Hughes would record in The Big 
Sea an attempt to attend a religious ceremony with Pey, one of his African shipmates. 
Hughes feels rejected when Pey does not identify him as African: “‘But I’m not a white 
man,’“ Hughes argues; “‘You no black man, neither,’ said Pey impatiently,” thus 
rejecting Hughes’s essentialized ideal of his own Africaness.18 By doing so, by looking at 
Hughes and acknowledging difference, Pey exhumes the inescapability of the very 
thetic experience “Rivers” seeks to elide. Although he does not realize it, Pey removes 
the “African” from African-American and leaves Hughes with “-American”: at a 
distance from American, not quite American, or simply a hyphen.19 Pey relegates him to 
an ambiguous, heterogeneous space from which Hughes cannot claim a single, ratified 
origin. As Hortense Spillers has suggested,  
 
[t]hose African persons in ‘middle Passage’ were literally suspended in the “oceanic,” if we think 
of the latter in its Freudian orientation as an analogy for undifferentiated identity: removed from 
the indigenous land and culture, and not-yet “American” either, these captive persons, without 
names that their captors would recognize, were in movement across the Atlantic, but they were 
also nowhere at all.20 
 
Pey’s abjection returns Hughes to nowhere at all as he adds to Hughes’s understanding 
of heritage a tacit awareness of his genealogical distance from Africa. As Arnold 
Rampersad notes, Hughes “quickly discovered that no African thought of him as one of 
them: ‘The Africans looked at me and would not believe I was a Negro.’“21 His, or for 
that matter any post-Passage subject’s, desire to return to a pure, single origin is 
reasonable in light of the privileged status given to genealogical homogeneity in the 
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context of any national identity. But the sanctity of the rivers, insofar as it posits an 
immutable racial origin, is undergirded by a misrecognition. Although Hughes’s water 
and blood metonym works in the interest of creating an unfragmented racial self, that 
same “blood”—genealogy—also reflects loss or, perhaps more precisely in this case, the 
truth of an heterogeneous, entangled origin, à la Hughes’s own muddy Mississippi.  
II. Dammed 
In what Dixon refers to as “an enigma of cultural memory,” Cullen’s 1925 “Heritage” is 
everything “Rivers” is not.22 It is as ambiguous as Hughes’s poem is certain, something 
murky and sensate to the sun of [438] Hughes’s hot and hard self-affirmation. In 
“Heritage,” one can never escape the absence of the thing itself, and here Cullen writes 




A book one thumbs  
Listlessly, till slumber comes.  
Unremembered are her bats  
Circling through the night, her cats  
Crouching in the river reeds,  
Stalking gentle flesh that feeds  
By the river brink. . . .23  
 
Here, the site of memory is self-consciously revealed as a site of artifice. This is captured 
in Cullen’s figuration of Africa as a book, which, mindlessly perused, becomes the 
ultimate signifier of memory cut loose from its milieu, set adrift without context and 
without reference. The absence of an authentic site of reference makes unremembering 
possible, as the reader, or perhaps even the book’s writer, actively chooses what to 
present. The imagery for what has been unremembered is sharp, dark, and quiet, as if 
the same river that brought Hughes a sense of comfort is for Cullen a place fraught with 
danger and ambivalence: there is no safety in Cullen’s text. Further, if we continue the 
notion that sites of memory anchor experience, what becomes evident is that there is no 
anchor for a real body, for “gentle flesh,” experiencing a real loss in the world, a loss 
that is not itself easily located.  
As Dixon reads it, Cullen’s poem “vacillates between acceptance and rejection of 
ancestry the speaker’s ambivalence fails to affirm—even ironically—the complexity of a 
self discovered through the art of memory.”24 But perhaps what Dixon identifies as a 
failure in Cullen’s art is in fact the poem’s organizing principle: this is a poem about the 
failure of art as compensation for reality, a failure that deepens the pain of remembering 




What is Africa to me: 
Copper sun or scarlet sea. 
Jungle star or jungle track, 
strong bronzed men, or regal black  
Women from whose loins I sprang  
When the birds of Eden sang 
One three centuries removed 
From the scenes his fathers loved,  
Spicy grove, cinnamon tree,  
What is Africa to me?  
(1–10)  
Where Dixon expects ironic self-reflection, Cullen offers tragedy, for even to write 
against the nostalgia of the constructed site of memory Cullen must use images gleaned 
from those very sites, a dilemma which is here played out as a problem of selection 
without knowledge: sun or sea, star or track, men or women. If “The Negro Speaks of 
Rivers,” then, hearkens to the recovery of loss, “Heritage” moves inexorably towards 
the loss of loss. As recovery marks the emergence of the subject in Hughes’s poem, in 
“Heritage” we instead find his dissolution.  
The subject’s dissolution is particularly compelling in light of what while reading the 
poem feels like the overwhelming presence of the speaker. The refrain, “What is Africa 
to me,” has, by the end of the stanza, become “removed / From the scenes his fathers 
loved,” with no ostensible transition from the first to third persons. This transition, 
from me to I to his, and back to me again, makes suspicious the very notion of 
subjecthood. If one is removed from the scenes one’s (fore)fathers loved, if one is 
detached from one’s ancestry, what indeed does Africa as a site mean to the very notion 
of me-ness? What does this absence mean for one’s very capacity for signification? And 
what, therefore, is the status of truth in the absence of reference? Is any utterance 
grounded in a lieu de mémoire necessarily untenable? The next stanza begins:  
 
so I lie, who all day long 
Want no sound except the song  
Sung by wild barbaric birds  
Goading massive jungle herds  
 (11–14)  
There are at least two possibilities of “lie”: that he is lying, passive and immobilized by 
contradictory forces of presence and absence, and also that he is lying; he is not telling 
the truth. The act of lying is always characterized in this poem as an urgent response, 
strengthened here by Cullen’s use of “[s]o,” which generates causality between the 
poem’s stanzas. Gerald Early notes that  
[s]ome readers have criticized “Heritage” for not offering more realistic images of Africa, 
decrying Cullen’s ignorance, but that is one of the many levels on which the poem [works], the 
narrator is lying. These images of Africa are lies; certainly Cullen knew that. but is the poem also 
lying when it suggests that Africa means nothing to the narrator?  
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or is the poem lying when it suggests that African means anything to the narrator? or is this very 
interiorized speech-act, speech-event poem nothing more than the system of lies that the 
impotent Black intellectual uses to heal his own sickness of alienation and despair?25 
Early is right to be suspicious, for is it not often the case that we suspect that a person 
claiming to have forgotten something is indeed lying? “I forgot” is different from “I 
never knew,” for the former must compulsively offer up a trace of the supposedly 
disappeared. It must point to the site of the unremembered: “Something has gone 
missing, but I do not know how.” Forgetting names a lost connection to a memory that 
may or may not still be present, and for this reason we might consider Cullen’s lying as 
way of positing memory’s limit as analogous to a limit in representation: the distance 
implicit in any formally ironic or allegorical gesture, the representation of one thing as 
another, the act of naming without naming; such strategies reflect the constitutive 
contradictions of a person realizing that he has lost memory of an experience that he has 
never had but, nonetheless, needs. In its own way, Cullen’s poem does everything 
Dixon would like it to do, but with unexpected results.  
In “Heritage,” Cullen offers us a subject about to explode under the pressure of 
balancing memory and history, and this is mainly articulated as a split between mind 
and body. The mind knows its history of absences and displacements; the body, 
meanwhile, is wrought by “pulsing tides” of memory (26). Like “Rivers,” Cullen’s 
poem represents a deeply self-referential experience, crossing boundaries between true 
and false by referring to nothing outside of the narrator’s word. There is no truth, but, 
and maybe more tragically, there is no false; he will not allow himself to be pulled into 
the book. However, unlike Hughes, whose poem disavows historical loss, Cullen 
interiorizes it, thus producing meaning through an incorporated contradiction, 
incorporated in the psychoanalytic sense, but also in the sense that Cullen makes the 
work of coping corporeal, leaving it to a body constituted by sensational acts of longing 
and un/remembering. In “Heritage,” the narrator exists only as a tension between the 
history of himself in the world and what he experiences as his body’s memory of 
something he has never known, a haunting affect.  
In an essay entitled “The Site of Memory,” Toni Morrison’s notion of emotional 
memory speaks to this sense of remembering in the shadow of Passage:  
you know, they straightened out the Mississippi river in places, to make room for houses and 
livable acreage. occasionally the river floods these places. “floods” is the word they use, but in 
fact it is not flooding; it is remembering. remembering where it used to be. all water has a perfect 
memory and is forever trying to get back where it was...  It is emotional memory—what the 
nerves and the skin remember as well as how it appeared.26  
 
Morrison begins her description with a disruption, the turning of the Mississippi River 
from its natural course. But because water has a perfect memory, because it cannot 
forget, it will always re-turn. Thus troped, Morrison’s river offers her reader a kind of 
memory that operates on two distinct levels: as an image frozen in the mind’s eye and 
as a sense that constitutes the body as a corporeal “I.”  
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Such linkage to the past, however, is far from easy and, once recognized, exacts a 
cost. We might remember here that when rivers flood, homes are destroyed and lives 
are lost or displaced. Indeed, in “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” Paul de Man notes that  
 
[w]hereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory 
designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, in renouncing the nostalgia and 
desire to coincide, it establishes a language in the void of this temporal difference. In so doing, it 
prevents itself from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though 
painfully, recognized as a non-self.27p 
 
Heritage” is haunted by the narrator’s recognition of himself as the poem’s subject, a 
subject who must answer to an unfamiliar and unrecognizable self that responds to calls 
he can never hope to know or understand. This haunting enables the poem’s allegorical 
structure, insofar as the epistemological journey that carries him away from the 
constructed symbols that constitute his knowledge of Africa cannot in fact lead him to 
another alternative; there is only distance, embodied in himself. For this narrator, then, 
Morrison’s flooding also means suffering from what he cannot know yet also cannot 
forget:  
so I lie, who always hear, 
Though I cram against my ear 
Both my thumbs, and keep them there,  
Great drums throbbing through the air.  
So I lie, whose fount of pride, 
dear distress, and joy allied 
Is my somber flesh and skin, 
With the dark blood dammed within  
Like great pulsing tides of wine  
That, I fear, must burst the fine  
Channels of the chafing net 
Where they surge and foam and fret  
(19–30)  
“Heritage” ends where “The Negro Speaks of Rivers” begins. In this instance, however, 
the river is dammed.  
III. Flooding 
Although Cullen’s poem focuses very clearly on the limits and dangers of the semiotic, 
it, in the end, also expresses the agony of a body that nonetheless threatens to attempt 
an impossible return. If we follow Kristeva, the presence-then-absence of the mother’s 
body structures subjectivity, and thus our nature and will to participate in the 
symbolic—our very speech—flows and ebbs according to this loss. She refers to this as 
chora, antecedent to signification, felt as absence, and mediated by language—
particularly as such absence is intentionally reified in poetic language—flowing 
through the subject and advocating the reclamation of lost sites. I hear this echoed in 
 13 
Morrison’s claim that “[w]riters are like that: remembering where we were, what valley 
we ran through, what the banks were like, the light that was there and the route back to 
our original place... [A] rush of imagination is our ‘flooding.’“28 At the most basic level, 
thinking about memory vis-à-vis the semiotic offers a way of thinking about aspects of 
memory that often seem beyond interpretation and escape rational discussion yet are 
somehow always described. “Like water,” Morrison concludes, “I remember where I 
was before I was ‘straightened out.’“29 
In a poem entitled “Danse Africaine” (1922), Hughes uses the figure of the drum to 
shift the responsibility for remembering more fully onto the body, which now must 
only respond to a prompt. Overdetermined, the rhythmic beating of the tom-tom moves 
the post-Passage body in time, moves it in memory of, in lieu of, the time before the 
break:  
And the tom-toms beat,  
And the tom-toms beat, 
And the low beating of the tom-toms  
Stirs your blood  
(12–15)  
As long as the tom-toms beat, the post-Passage subject will respond to its rhythms. 
Unprovable, unreferenceable, and carried on the lowest [443] frequencies, such notions, 
or perhaps more precisely such feelings—such surgings, such foamings, and such 
frettings—offer insight into the ways something familiar might be produced out of 
something we are never sure to know. But what, as Cullen might wonder, is the place of 
agency in this? Where is the balance between thinking one knows and knowing one 
knows?  
Helene Johnson, another Harlem Renaissance poet, offers a sophisticated middle 
space between Hughes’s acquisitive enthusiasm and Cullen’s haunted weariness. In a 
piece entitled “Poem,” Johnson speaks to how any ambivalence one might feel about a 
site of memory need not necessarily be antithetical to finding value or usefulness 
therein. The poem’s speaker is a girl in a club, watching a singer on stage in Harlem:  
 
Little brown boy, 
Slim, dark, big-eyed, 
Crooning love songs to your banjo 
Down at the Lafayette— 
Gee, boy, I love the way you hold your head,  
High sort of and a bit to one side, 
Like a prince, a jazz prince. And I love 
Your eyes flashing, and your hands, 
And your patent-leathered feet, 
And your shoulders jerking the jig-wa. 
And I love your teeth flashing, 
And the way your hair shines in the spotlight  
Like it was the real stuff.30 
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There is obvious affection in her references to the performer as “[l]ittle” and “[s]lim” 
and “big-eyed,” descriptions that might seem otherwise incongruous with his status as 
an entertainer at one of Harlem’s most important night clubs. And it is indeed clear 
that, despite the quiet “[g]ee, boy” intimacy with which she describes him, he holds her 
too in his power:  
 
Gee, brown boy, I loves you all over.  
I’m glad I’m a jig. I’m glad I can  
Understand your dancin’ and your  
Singin’, and feel all the happiness  
And joy and don’t care in you.  
(14–18)  
The speaker’s identity as a jig, which places her socially, racially, and sexually within a 
certain milieu, comes into being through her sense of understanding the brown boy’s 
performance. On stage, he is visually [444] enlarged and vibrant, “flashing” and 
“jerking” and “shin[ing].” But, again, there is something slow and drawn-out in her 
description of him, and this slow-motion tempo creates a sense that the speaker might 
somehow know more about the boy on stage, in his presence, than the poem’s reader 
ever could. Perhaps this is because even though the poem’s imagery gives us one thing, 
a bright, fast, and vibrant jig-wa, the poem’s speaker distinctly hears something else 
behind the visual, something moving on a different time:  
 
Gee, boy, when you sing, I can close my eyes  
And hear tom-toms just as plain. 
(19–20)  
“Tom-toms”—a new buzzword to the Harlem Renaissance, a newly enlarged frame of 
reference, a still-fresh site of memory that refers back to the “dancin’“ and the 
“[s]ingin’“ and “the happiness.” Does she hear the tom-tom in his voice? Or does she 
hear the tom-tom in her own listening?  
 
Listen to me, will you, what do I know 
About tom-toms? But I like the word, sort of,  
Don’t you? It belongs to us.     
(21–23)  
The speaker hesitates in the midst of her reverie. She knows that, despite the real 
pleasure she might experience in her feelings, there might also be something superficial, 
artificial, in hearing tom-toms behind his voice. But what matters is the ownership and 
sharing of the artifice, more so than the relative veracity of its significations. After this 
brief hesitation, the poem ends by echoing its own beginning, now even further 
collapsing the distance between the speaker and the boy on stage:  
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Gee, boy, I love the way you hold your head, and the way you sing, and dance, 
And everything. 
Say, I think you’re wonderful. You’re  
Alright with me,  
You are.  
(24–29) 
The distance is closing, but not completely. Much as the singer’s hair shines in the 
spotlight only like ”the real stuff,” there will be no grand becoming or explosive 
transcendence. She does not become him and [445] he does not become anything more 
than who he already is, a boy with a banjo. “You’re / Alright with me,” is not even “I 
love you.” But it is a real affection. And what matters here is the graciousness of the 
final “You are,” all anyone needs to give and receive in order to live life more fully, the 
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